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Abstract 
This paper describes a seismic risk assessment for existing trunk lines which are to be annually expanded by the 
subsystems consisting of a subsidiary pipeline network and the shutoff valve. The maintenance activities range from 
daily patrols to large-scale retrofit, while taking the deterioration effect into consideration. The discussion focuses on 
the probability of failure for the overall system, for various combinations of the safety level in the control valve and 
the pipeline network. 
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1. Introduction 
All kinds of structures in Japan are threatened by two types of earthquake; those originating from plate 
tectonics and those from inland active faults. Furthermore, all existing structures are in the deteriorating 
environments which can often significantly impair structural safety. 
  The existing pipelines were designed to comply with the safety requirements based on the seismic 
design codes prevailing at that time, and have been safely operated by performing daily maintenance. 
Over many years, however, the original system will face not only severe loading conditions but also 
many business requirements, and therefore may be expanded with subsidiary systems which consist of a 
pipeline network and one shutoff valve to disconnect the subsystem from the main line when a leakage or 
breakage occurs in the subsystem or valve equipment. It is important to note that the original system and 
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future subsidiary systems were separately designed based on their own probabilities of failure; the 
probability of failure for a future overall system was not considered at the initial stage. 
  If firms require the performance of the system to be improved each year, the present system must be 
expanded year by year, but the overall system then has a greater risk of potential defects as well as a 
higher probability of failure under seismic and deteriorating environments. 
  In order to keep the probability of failure for the overall system below the target level, potential 
defects must be minimized through daily patrols and periodic inspections. Especially, when the system is 
located in a seismically active area, repairs and retrofitting are also necessary to keep its seismic 
performance at the required level.  
  The present study considers that when a new subsidiary system is introduced into the existing system, 
the current maintenance scheme should be revised to comply with a new safety requirement which is 
based on the probability of failure for the existing system and that for the new subsidiary one. 
  It should be noted that the existing system is conditioned on the fact that the system actually exists 
and on the annual rate of occurrence of various types of damage including corrosion defects, dents and 
mechanically defective cracks produced under deteriorating situations. Since the seismic damage to 
buried pipelines is often initiated at these deterioration- induced defects for severe ground motions and 
large peak ground displacements due to liquefaction and fault movements, maintenance activities should 
focus on these defects to ensure pipeline safety. 
  This paper also discusses the probability of failure for the overall system, for various combinations of 
the safety level of the control valve and the pipeline network in the subsidiary system. The final objective 
is to propose several maintenance options for the overall pipeline system under seismic and deteriorating 
environments. 
2. Reliability analysis 
2.1.  Model system 
A typical example of a trunk line in Japan is shown in Figure 1. The supply to meet the demand in 
each district is delivered through each control valve to the subsystems, which have been constructed year 
by year as demand has increased. The basic configuration of the pipeline system is shown in Figure 2 
where many subsystems branch out along the trunk line. 
  Figure 3 shows the numerical model used in this study in which A is the source node and B is the 
demand node, and the k-th subsystem is constructed after the (k-1)-th subsystem was successfully 
operated. 
Node A
Node B
Node C
zone
1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Figure 1. A typical pipeline configuration in Japan. 
884  T. Imai and T. Koike / Procedia Engineering 14 (2011) 882–897
g g
㪪㫆㫌㫉㪺㪼
㪥㫆㪻㪼
㪪㫌㪹㫊㫐㫊㫋㪼㫄
㪧㫀㫇㪼㫃㫀㫅㪼
㪣㪜㪞㪜㪥㪛
㪪㪿㫌㫋㫆㪽㪽㩷㫍㪸㫃㫍㪼
Figure 2. A simplified model of a pipeline system with several subsystems. 
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Figure 3. The numerical model of the k-th subsystem provided after the (k-1)-th subsystem which was successfully operated. 
2.2.Seismic performance and damage modes 
2.2.1. Definitions 
Existing lifelines in Japan are always threatened by seismic hazards of Level 1 and Level 2 ground 
motions caused by the maximum operating earthquake (EQ1) and the maximum considered earthquake 
(EQ2), respectively. 
(1) Definition of seismic performance 
Seismic performance of a lifeline system (Imai & Koike 2009) can be defined as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Definition of seismic performance 
Seismic
performance Definition
1
The system performance can be maintained without
any disruption for a Level 1 earthquake ground
motion (EQ1), whether the system is slightly
damaged or not.
2
The system performance can be restarted after short
repair for a Level 2 earthquake ground motion
(EQ2), when the system is not significantly
damaged.
3
The system performance can be restored after
disruption by a Level 2 earthquake ground motion
(EQ2), when the system is not completely
damaged.
The seismic performance can be qualitatively defined in terms of the probability of performance 
damage modes as follows. 
(2) Definition of performance damage modes 
The performance damage modes of a lifeline system are defined as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Definition of performance damage modes 
Damage mode Definition
Minor The system serviceability is in the minor
damage state by EQ1, and the probability of
minor damage occurrence is defined as
.
Moderate The system serviceability is in the moderate
damage state by EQ2, and the probability of
moderate damage occurrence is defined as
.
Major The system serviceability is in the major
damage state by EQ2, and the probability of
major damage occurrence is defined as
.
minor
EQDp
moderate
EQDp
major
EQD
p
minor
EQD
moderate
EQD
major
EQD
The probability of performance damage modes means the probability that the seismic performance 
cannot be maintained in the event of seismic load EQ1 or EQ2.  
(3) Definition of structural damage modes 
The structural damage modes of a lifeline component are defined as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Definition of structural damage modes 
Damage modes Definition
Minor The elastic structural response       exceeds the critical
level      by EQ1, and the probability of minor damage
occurrence is defined as                .
Moderate The inelastic structural response       exceeds the critical
level      for a small leakage by EQ2, and the probability of
moderate damage occurrence is defined as               .
Major  The inelastic structural response     exceeds the critical
level      for a large leakage by EQ2, and the probability of
major damage occurrence is defined as                   .
orZ min
erateZ mod
majorZ
BS1
B
aS
*
2
Bε
B
Uε
*
2
Bε
B
Uε
minor
EQZp
moderate
EQZp
major
Zp EQ
moderatemoderate
2
1,, 2 EQSEQ SLDtCRxtZ ⋅−+−≡
Let us define the damage modes for structural components as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1,, 1
minorminor
EQSEQ SLDtCRxtZ ⋅−+−≡
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1,, 2 EQSEQ SLDtCRxtZ ⋅−+−≡
( ) ( ) ( )majormajor
 (1) 
, , , , ,SZ R C D L Swhere  are performance function, pipe strength, seismic disaster prevention 
investment, dead load, live load and seismic load, effectively, and 1EQ
®
­
=
t
t
EQ at occur not  does 0
            at  occurs 1
1
( )[ ] ( ) ( )
 is given by 
EQ
EQ
 earthquake an :
 earthquake an :
¯
2.2.2. Probability of performance damage modes
In the case of major damage mode, for instance, the probability of performance damage is given by: 
[ ]
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where AB is linear stretching length between nodes A and B. The strength Rmajor(CS, t) of the 
lifeline system can be upgraded when the seismic disaster prevention investment CS is adequately used 
for the retrofitting work. The probability of performance damage mode in various stages of the system 
can then be estimated with its corresponding resistance of the system as follows: 
(1) the initial strength:  
       (3a) 
(2) the strength before the retrofitting: 
 (3b)( ),0major TR p
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(3) the strength after the retrofitting: 
       (3c)
(4)the strength in the future:  
        (3d)
where CS is the seismic disaster prevention investment, and Tp is the present time, and  is a 
deterioration factor which is defined by 
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where 1  and 2ξ ξ are deterioration parameters and DT is the service period of the system. 
2.3.Formulation of seismic safety 
2.3.1. The original trunk line
The probability of failure for the original trunk line from the source node A to the demand node B in 
Figure 1 is given by: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] »º«ª <−−= ¦³L EQjk AB dxEQxtZPEQtDP 0 0,exp1 ν »¼«¬ j                                                                          (5) 
where jν is the occurrence rate of the j-th defect (j=1 corrosion; j=2 dent; j=3 crack propagation), 
respectively. The performance function is described by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xSxLxDRtxtZ AB −−−≡ 0, ψ                                                                                                                 (6)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xSxLxDt ,,,R ,0 ψwhere  are the initial strength, deterioration factor, dead load, live load and 
seismic load, respectively. 
  In the initial stage, the pipeline system is designed such that the probability of failure is less than the 
following value: 
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2.3.2. The trunk line combined with a subsystem 
When a subsystem is attached to the trunk line, the damage state of the expanded system can be 
defined as the summation of damage states including the trunk line AB, an additional network S1, and a 
control valve V1 under the condition of survival of the previous system as follows: 
[ ] [ ]* * ABVSAB DDDDPDDP 1101 =                                                                                                       (8)
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( ) ( ) ( ) DtDtDtD =
  The k-th expanded system is produced when a subsystem is added to the (k-1)-th expanded system. 
Therefore, the damage state for the k-th expanded system is expressed as: 
* * kk VSkk 1−
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                                                                                                                             (9) 
where the parameter t is defined in the range of . The probability of failure for the k-th subsystem 
is given by: 
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where the performance function for the k-th network is defined as: 
                                                                                          (11)
kk SkS
  Noting that a control valve is installed at the connection point with the trunk line, the probability of 
failure for the k-th valve is defined as: [ ] [ ]EQZPEQDP
kk VV 0<=                                                                                                                                   (12) 
where the performance function for the k-th valve is given as: ( )
kkk VVV xELRZ −−= D−                                                                                                                                    (13) 
where 
kV
x is the location of the k-th valve. 
  The probability of failure for the k-th expanded system is defined as 
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2.3.3. Design hazard function for the trunk line with  the k-th subsystem 
Note that Eq. (15) is a hazard function for the k-th expansion system. Now we introduce a design 
ha
kk DtD =− τ1
zard function in which the probability of failure for the k-th expansion system should be less than the 
design value: [ ] kTHkk DDP ≤−1 p                                                                                                                                                     (16)
                                                (17) 
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D
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  Hence, the following equation is obtained: 
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Figure 4 shows a schematic image of the hazard function at each time section which does not exceed 
the target value. 
  In the same way, the hazard function at the (k-1)- th step is also derived as: 
( ) pDtDP THkk k≤»¼º«¬ª −− −21 1τ tttt kkk <<≤ −−− 112   ,for τ                                                                                 (20) 
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Figure 4. Profile of the hazard function at time tk-2, tk-1 and tk. 
From Eq.(20), the k-th design hazard function is obtained, conditioned by the inequality formula: 
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  By inverting Eq. (21), the probabilities of failure for the combined subsystem SVk and the control 
valve Vk are: 
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3. Structural failure of pipeline components 
3.1. Failures from potential defects under deteriorating process 
Structural strength (Koike & Garciano 2005) has a time-variant characteristic due to the process of 
deterioration and failure will occur when the hoop stress exceeds the strength for the material having a 
defect X which is given by 
( ) ( ) 0XXX RttR ⋅=ψ                                                                                                                                 (24) 
Then the probability of failure for the material with a defect X is given by [ ]0<−= hRPp σmajormajor XZ                                                                                                                                    (25) 
3.1.1. Corrosion failure 
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0C flowR σ=The critical strength for corrosion failure is measured by the flow stress which is given by .
The deterioration effect for the corrosion damage mode can be evaluated using the parameters: 
2
1    ,   11 C2 =−= ξξ                                                                                                                          (26)1 MC
where M is the Folias factor. 
The hoop stress of the pipeline is applied to the defect as the load effect and is given by: 
t
DPr
h 2
⋅
=σ                                                                                                                                                           (27) 
where Pr , D, and t are the internal pressure, diameter and wall thickness of the pipeline, respectively. 
3.1.2. Dent failure 
The critical strength of a dent defect with a gouge as shown in Figure 5 is formulated by: 
( )sR flowD 10 cos2 −= πσ                                                                                                                             (28)
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Then the corresponding dent is also given by 
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where Ldmax, t and TD are the maximum dent size, time and service period of the system, respectively. 
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Figure 5. A schematic profile of a dent with a gouge. 
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l methods use the following formula to estimate the critical strength for crack 
3.1.3. Crack propagation 
Conventional analytica
propagation: 
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where  and η  are Charpy toughness, a coefficient formula assigned by each design code 
with pipe parameters of radius R and wall thickness t, and a parameter for crack propagation, respectively. 
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3.2.  Failures due to seismic loads 
 a seismic effect is evaluated by different formulations which depend 
on the earthquake load type produced by the ground response of the surface ground or permanent ground 
dis
fect         
t is given by the ground response, the following formula gives the 
probability of failure for earthquakes EQ1 and EQ2, respectively: 
The probability of failure due to
placement (PGD). 
3.2.1.  Seismic wave ef
When a seismic wave effec
[ ]iScr EQP εε <                                                                                                                                                        (33) 
where crε  is critical strain, and Sε  is seismic strain produced in the pipeline given by: 
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where SV and T a
respectively.
re the response velocity spectrum and the typical period of the surface ground, 
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3.2
The Japan Gas Association (JGA 2000) described the seismic assessment method for a pipeline 
splacement (PGD) produces an opening or closing 
angle at a bend pipe as shown in Figure 6. 
.2. Peak ground displacement in a liquefied zone 
crossing a liquefied zone in which the peak ground di
Noting that failure occurs when the deformed angle exceeds the critical value, the probability of 
failure is given by:  [ ]EQP ωω <                                               iLcr
where crL
                                                                                                       (37)
ωω ,  are deformed angle and its critical value. 
(1) On a slope                                                                                       (2) Along a quay wall 
Figure 6. Schematic profiles of liquefaction damage of bend pipes on a slope and along a quay wall. 
For instance, for a bend pipe located in a liquefied slope area, and which is deformed in the opening 
mode, the JGA proposed the following formula: 
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and ηδ ,,, 600 ch RD
purposes, radius of c
are permanent 
vature of the
ground displacement, pipe diameter of 600mm for calibration 
4.
4.1. Maintenance strategies 
When a pipeline system is developed by adding a new subsystem to the trunk line, the maintenance 
following four items in the maintenance strategy:  
ur  bend pipe, and a parameter ranging from 0.77 to 0.88. 
Mai agements for trunk line with sub-systems ntenance man
engineer should consider the 
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d out to maintain the safety for the 
ser
imit state.
4.2
ccidents caused by third-party incidents. Visual inspections 
are useful to detect corrosion cracks and any other evidence of deterioration before a disaster occurs. 
Th
able 4. Statistics values of defect size for potential defects. 
Defect size
(1) A failure spreading from the subsystem to the trunk line must be stopped at the shutoff valve. 
Therefore, a high-quality control valve should be installed. 
(2) Special attention should be paid to the deteriorated portions in the preceding subsystems. 
(3) Daily patrol and periodic inspections should be carrie
viceability limit state; and 
(4) A large-scale retrofitting project should be prepared to ensure the safety for the ultimate l
. Daily maintenance and large-scale retrofitting 
4.2.1.  Field patrols and visual inspections 
Field patrols are effective to avoid dent a
ese maintenance activities can minimize the increase of potential defects. In the present study, 
statistical data of potential cracks are assumed as shown in Table 4. 
T
mean cov
mm
1 Corrosion crack C 10 0.3
2 Dent D 20 0.3
3 Crack propagation P 5 0.3
Defect mode Symbol
ese potential defects, however, full-scale inspection and  In order to decrease th  retrofitting must be 
executed. 
minimum bounds for crack detection is assumed in Table 5 are as shown in Table 5. 
Figure 7 shows a schematic profile of the inspection filter for full-scale inspections, in which the 
maximum and 
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Table 5. The bounds of defect size for the inspection
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m 5
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In large-scale retrofitting, detected defects must be automatically repaired, and the defective material 
th new material.  This updating process, as shown in Figure 8, is 
ayesian approach (Ang & Tang 1 75)in which the revised distribution 
must be immediately replaced wi
assumed to be carried out by the B
is g
9
iven by: 
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where [ ]sPff SS detection,, * are prior distribution, posterior distribution and probability of the non-
 a potential defect is given by 
detection, respectively. 
Then the probability of failure for a pipe element having
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Figure 8. Probability density functions of defect size in the inspection filter, before inspection and after inspection. 
4.3. Simulated results for optimal maintenance  management 
 deterioration parameters as 
sho
Tab
Duration
year
Symbol ξ 1 ξ 2 T DDefect mode
Deterioration parameters
For the numerical calculations, the following three items are considered: 
(1) large-scale retrofitting; 
(2) target level of design hazard functions; 
(3) quality assurance of control valves.
n on potential defects are taken into account by  The effects of deterioratio
wn in Table 6. 
le 6. Deterioration parameters of potential defects 
1 Corrosion crack C 0.5 0.5 50
2 Dent D 0.75 0.5 50
3 Crack propagation P 1 0.5 50
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4.3.1.  Effect of large-scale retrofitting activity 
Large-scale retrofitting is carried out 20 g point. Figure 9 shows ifferent 
profiles of Eq. (18) for the earthquake load co EQ1, EQ2 and EQ2+PGD, re y. The 
ordinate of these figures is the hazard function, 
 years after the startin
nditions of 
three d
spectivel[ ]1−kk DDP , and the probability of failure, [ ]kDP , for the 
expanded system. The result for EQ1 and EQ2 are similar, but the case of EQ2+PGD shows a simple 
urve before and after the large-scale retrofitting activity. This simple curve may be due to a c
comparatively large strain of seismic load which dim
h. 
inishes certain variations in the deterioration effect 
and revised distribution by the Bayesian approac
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Figure 9. Effect of large-scale retrofitting for various earthquake load combinations. 
4.3.2. Target level of design hazard functions 
In order to obtain an appropriate probability of failure for the expansion sys , the hazard function in 
Eq.(15) must be controlled to be less than the target hazard curve as shown in E
0 shows sample profiles of target hazard functions for EQ1, EQ2 and EQ2+PGD, while 
Figure 11 expresses the result for each earthquake load. These figures show the probability of failure for 
tem
q.(16).
  Figure 1
[ ] [ ]
kk VSV DPDP ,  and their corresponding upper bounds [ ] [ ]tDP kV − given by Eq. (22) and (23). 
All these figures suggest that 
tDP
kSV − ,[ ]
kSV
Thi
DP  after the large-scale retrofitting shows a slightly decreasing trend. 
es the distribution function of residual potential defects, 
because the deterioration effect is increased in the model of Eq.(4). 
s means that retrofitting effectively improv
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Figure 10. Target hazard function for various seismic load combinations. 
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Figure 11. Assessment of the subsystem for assumed design hazard functions for seismic loads. 
4.3.3. Quality assurance of control valves 
The control valve is the key device for isolating the trunk line from the damaged subsystem. Therefore,  
the control valve must perform flawlessly in the emergency situations.  
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1 compares two different qualities of valve. [ ] 002.0=VDP  means that the quality of this 
valve is less than that of [ ] 001.0=DP .
e 
  Figure 1
V
  Valve (1) cannot satisfy the safety condition up to the 15th year, while valve (2) can maintain safety 
probability of failure for the control valve should bover the service period. This result suggests th
at least less than 0.001. 
at the 
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Figure 12. Required assurance quality of control valves. 
5. Conclusions 
Procedures for assessing the risk of expanding the trunk line by subsystems were proposed, taking in o 
consideration the seismic and deteriorating hazards. 
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